Affluent households are trading into convenience, health and premium value. Pressured households are trading down. The brands in the middle are losing the right to price without proving volume.
The wedge, 2022–2026
Two shoppers, diverging
Upper arm · affluent spendingLower arm · pressured shoppers
Illustrative indexed trend (2022 = 100). The two trend lines are stylized — they are not measured data. Only the callout figures are real, verified results: Walmart, Costco, TJX, Dollar General, Dollar Tree, Target, Kraft Heinz and General Mills FY2025 company results, plus Numerator’s SNAP panel.
What they said. What the numbers said.
Eight earnings calls, eight executives — each claim paired with the financial result it maps to. Scroll to move through the voices.
Every frame pairs what an executive said on the call with what the company’s own filing reported for the same period — two sources, one story.
Walmart
Doug McMillonPresident & CEO · Q3 FY2025 earnings call, Nov 19, 2024
“Households earning more than $100,000 made up 75% of our share gains.”
The filing
+5.3%
Walmart U.S. comp sales (ex. fuel), Q3 FY2025 — the gains McMillon attributed to $100K+ households
Chris KempczinskiChairman & CEO · Q3 2025 earnings call, Nov 5, 2025
“In the U.S., we continue to see a bifurcated consumer base, with QSR traffic from lower-income consumers declining nearly double digits in the third quarter, a trend that’s persisted for nearly two years. In contrast, traffic growth among higher-income consumers remained strong, increasing nearly double digits in the quarter.”
The filing
+2.4%
U.S. comparable sales, Q3 2025 — the net result across the bifurcated cohorts
“Kirkland Signature sales penetration continues to increase, bringing even more high-quality value to our members while offsetting potentially inflationary impacts from tariffs.”
The filing
+5.9%
Comparable sales, FY2025. Costco does not officially disclose a Kirkland dollar figure.
“Higher-income customers have been a meaningful growth driver for us,” with “a meaningful traffic increase from customers with household incomes of more than $100,000.”
The filing
+5.4%
Same-store net sales, Q1 FY2025 (continuing operations)
Brian CornellChair & CEO · Q1 2025 earnings call, May 2025
“Our team and our business faced an exceptionally challenging environment … with declines in both traffic and sales, most notably in our discretionary categories.”
The filing
−3.8%
Comparable sales, Q1 2025 — the quarter Cornell called exceptionally challenging
“Look, we recorded a $9.3 billion non-cash impairment charge, and the trigger for that was only the fact that we have a sustained decline in the stock price, and that has reduced the carrying value of our intangible assets.”
The filing
−$9.3B
Non-cash impairment losses, Q2 2025 — “primarily driven by a sustained decline in our share price.”
The upper arm is not “spending more.” It is spending differently.
Club, off-price, premium health, protein and convenience — affluent shoppers are seeking value without giving up quality.
01 / 06
Walmart said households earning more than $100,000 generated 75% of its share gains in late 2024. Costco posted 6% comparable-sales growth in FY2025 while Kirkland reached roughly $90 billion in sales. TJX beat every element of its FY2025 guidance, with 4% comparable growth driven entirely by transactions.
This is not a simple luxury trade-up. It is affluent shoppers seeking value without giving up quality — club economics, treasure-hunt discovery, fast fulfillment and products with an outcome attached to them.
75%
of Walmart’s share gains came from households earning $100K+
TJX FY2025 comparable growth, driven entirely by transactions
TJX FY2025 results
~$90B
Kirkland Signature sales — the upper arm’s private label
Costco FY2025 annual report
The lower arm is selecting for value with ruthless clarity.
Hard value, private label, deal-seeking and smaller baskets — pressured shoppers reward retailers that make the trade-off explicit.
02 / 06
Dollar General’s “Back to Basics” program produced 3.0% comparable growth and a 34.1% increase in diluted EPS in its fiscal 2025. Dollar Tree’s multi-price conversion delivered 5.3% comparable growth. Both businesses made the value proposition easier to see and easier to buy.
The lesson is not that every low-price format wins. It is that pressured shoppers are rewarding retailers that make the trade-off explicit: price, pack, proximity and private label.
+34.1%
Dollar General diluted EPS increase, fiscal 2025
Dollar General FY2025 results
+5.3%
Dollar Tree comparable growth, fiscal 2025
Dollar Tree FY2025 results
+5.3% / +4.8%
Dollar Tree and Grocery Outlet buy-rate rises among SNAP households during restrictions
Numerator: SNAP Under Pressure
+1.2%
Walmart buy-rate rise among SNAP households during restrictions
Numerator: SNAP Under Pressure
The middle is where strategy gets exposed.
Mainstream branded center-store and undifferentiated general merchandise — neither clearly the cheapest nor clearly the most differentiated.
03 / 06
Target expected discretionary demand to normalize. Instead, fiscal 2025 comparable sales fell 2.6%, net sales fell 1.7%, and operating income fell 8.1%. In food, Kraft Heinz posted a 3.4% organic-sales decline and $9.3 billion of non-cash impairments. General Mills’ North America Retail sales fell 5%.
Those are different companies with different problems. But they share a structural position: not clearly the cheapest, not clearly the most differentiated, and increasingly unable to make the mainstream middle feel like a destination.
“The K is not ‘premium wins, value loses.’ Both arms can win. The undifferentiated middle is what gets hollowed out.”
−2.6%
Target FY2025 comparable sales
Target FY2025 results
−3.4%
Kraft Heinz organic-sales decline, FY2025
Kraft Heinz FY2025 results
$9.3B
Kraft Heinz non-cash impairments on mainstream brands
Kraft Heinz FY2025 results
−5%
General Mills North America Retail sales, fiscal 2025
General Mills FY2025 results
Two pressures, different evidence.
GLP-1 redirects a still-spending shopper. SNAP cuts compress the budget itself. Both reward protein and satiety; both punish undifferentiated, full-price center-store brands — but the evidence bar is not the same.
04 / 06
The industry’s posture on GLP-1 has moved from dismissal to protein, portion and health strategy. Nestlé launched Vital Pursuit and later added a “GLP-1 Friendly” label; Danone moved into Kate Farms and agreed to buy Huel for a reportedly €1 billion; PepsiCo added smaller portions and protein extensions. Yet none of the top-25 CPG companies in the research has booked a quantified GLP-1 sales loss.
That distinction matters. The strategic response is real. The size of the realized financial impact is not yet publicly measured. The better near-term read is that GLP-1 accelerates an existing upper-arm shift toward outcomes — protein, satiety, portion control and functional nutrition.
SNAP pressure is more observable. Numerator compared what SNAP households said they would do with what its purchase panel observed during the October–November 2025 shutdown and early food-restriction-waiver states. Deal-seeking showed up in the data: Dollar Tree buy rates rose 5.3%, Grocery Outlet 4.8% and Walmart 1.2%. Baskets shifted toward private label, while branded center-store categories took larger buy-rate declines.
Circana’s 2026 read found SNAP shoppers prioritizing produce, meat and protein, dairy, and frozen fruit and vegetables over more discretionary soda, candy and prepared foods.
Caveat: the public evidence supports the direction of behavior — smaller baskets, more promotions, more private label and more value-channel shopping — but not a clean company-by-company revenue bridge. Until retailers disclose that bridge, SNAP exposure should be treated as a demand risk, not a precise forecast.
What leadership teams should do next.
Four operating moves for a market that no longer has a middle to hide in.
05 / 06
Choose an armValue or meaning
Win with an unmistakable price architecture, or with a benefit consumers can name. “Mainstream premium” is becoming a dangerous default.
Read units firstVolume before revenue
Price can protect the top line while demand quietly leaves. Separate price, mix and unit contribution in every growth review.
Segment by needNot income alone
The same affluent shopper can buy Kirkland, treasure-hunt at TJX and pay more for protein. The K is behavioral, not just demographic.
Follow capitalClaims are cheap
Product renovation, pack architecture, distribution and portfolio moves tell us more than trend language on a conference stage.
Sources, definitions and caveats
This page collects the K-shaped consumer thesis for Wednesday, September 16, 2026, from company results, public leadership statements and the September 2026 CPG research corpus. GLP-1 response examples and caveats are drawn from company results, public leadership statements and the research corpus. The analysis does not claim a quantified GLP-1 sales effect where companies have not disclosed one. SNAP panel results describe observed shopping behavior, not a company-level revenue forecast.