Pricing masked weak volumes
in fourteen of twenty-three.
I tested the thesis against every manufacturer with an official FY2025 price/volume split — 25 companies. Fourteen fit: pricing masked weak, flat, or falling volume. Nine break, and they are named below. Two did not disclose enough to classify.
25 manufacturers tested against official FY2025 releases (nearest verified quarter where no annual split exists). 14 fit, 9 break, 2 excluded (L’Oréal, Hormel — no company-stated split). Common 0–11% scale. Company definitions differ (pricing, real internal growth, revenue per hectolitre), so comparisons are directional, not exact. Heineken and AB InBev report no additive split; revenue per hectolitre is their own price proxy. Henkel’s split is approximate. Full table and sources below.
Every point of growth
came from charging more.
Mondelēz grew organic revenue 4.3% in 2025 while volume/mix fell 3.7%. That is a price increase with fewer units behind it.
We did a lot less promotion and pricing. As a consequence, our price realization went up… But we lost some market share because our volume performance wasn’t the same.
I tested 23 manufacturers: fourteen fit the pattern, nine break it. Kraft Heinz is the extreme — 2025 organic sales fell 3.4% with pricing adding 0.7 points while volume/mix removed 4.1. Kimberly-Clark is the counter — organic +1.7% on volume +2.5pp with price down 0.9pp, seven straight quarters of volume growth.
Units stepped down. Prices kept climbing.
Sales followed the units.
According to Bain & Company’s analysis of NielsenIQ data, US grocery volume fell about 2% year over year in February 2026, then 0.4%, 2.2%, 1.9% and 1.8% in each month through June — while prices kept climbing 2–3%. Year-over-year sales growth was cut in half.
US grocery volume, year-over-year % change, Feb–Jun 2026. Prices rose 2–3% YoY over the same months. Source: Bain & Company analysis of NielsenIQ data, via Food Navigator, August 2026.
Pricing growth and inflation can no longer hide that shoppers are buying fewer items.
The timing is not a coincidence. The step-down began the month the SNAP changes under HR 1 took effect — and the shoppers who lost benefits traded straight down to dollar stores and private label, exactly where branded center-store bleeds first.
Baskets are shrinking
at both ends of the income curve.
From the top: Cornell and Numerator found households with a GLP-1 user cut grocery spending 5.3% within six months of adoption — 8% among higher-income households — with the steepest cuts in snacks, sweet bakery and cookies.
It’s still relatively early days in the consumption of GLP-1s, but you definitely see a shift across food and beverages. You definitely see less snacking… lot less alcohol… on the reverse side, you see more coffee, more diet, more protein drinks.
From the bottom: Numerator’s January 2026 survey of SNAP households found at-risk shoppers moving spend into Sam’s Club, Dollar Tree and Aldi, planning to shop sales (54%), buy private label (37%) and visit dollar stores (30%). The middle — branded center-store at full price — is where both pressures land. That is the K-shape I wrote about yesterday, playing out in the basket.
Rebuild the value equation,
not the price list.
The companies adapting fastest aren’t fighting the squeeze. They’re redesigning around it.
1. Price-pack architecture as strategy. Smaller packs at honest per-ounce math, entry price points, value formats — formats that earn an occasion instead of lifting the ticket.
2. Protein-forward reformulation. GLP-1 households buy more protein drinks, meat snacks and yogurt. The basket is shifting; the portfolio has to shift with it.
3. Measure growth in units first. Revenue growth is an output. The operating questions are households, frequency, mix and units. If those stay weak, the brand is renting growth from price.
My bottom line: pricing was the right defense against inflation. It became the wrong story about growth. The next earnings-quality question isn’t “how much did organic sales grow?” It’s “how much came from more demand — and how much came from charging the remaining demand more?”